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Résumé: Les politiques de sécurité routière utilisent souvent des mécanismes incitatifs basés sur les 
infractions pour améliorer le comportement des conducteurs. Ces mécanismes sont, soit 
monétaires (amendes, primes d'assurance), soit non monétaires (permis à points). Nous 
analysons l'efficacité de ces mécanismes dans l'incitation à une conduite prudente. Nous 
déterminons leurs propriétés théoriques par rapport au nombre de points associés aux 
infractions et par rapport au temps contrat. Ces propriétés sont ensuite testées empiriquement 
dans un modèle qui sépare l'aléa moral de l'hétérogénéité inobservée. Nous concluons à la 
présence d'aléa moral dans les données. Par ailleurs, la prime indicée sur les points introduite 
en 1992 a réduit de 15% la fréquence d'infractions. Enfin, nous comparons l'efficacité globale 
de ces différents mécanismes incitatifs et nous calculons des équivalents monétaires pour les 
infractions et les suspensions de permis. 
 
Abstract: Road safety policies often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations to promote 
safe driving. These mechanisms are both monetary (fines, insurance premiums) and non-
monetary (point-record driving licenses). We analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms 
in promoting safe driving. We derive their theoretical properties with respect to contract time 
and accumulated demerit points. These properties are then tested empirically in a model 
which separates moral hazard from unobserved heterogeneity. We do not reject the presence 
of moral hazard in the Quebec public insurance regime. Moreover, we verify that the 
experience rating introduced in 1992 did reduce the frequency of traffic violations by 15%. 
Lastly, we compare the effectiveness of the different incentive schemes and we derive 
monetary equivalents for traffic violations and license suspensions. 
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1 Introduction
Since the 1970s fatality rates due to road-traﬃc accidents have decreased steadily
in developed countries, although risk exposure increased at the same time (see
OECD, 2005). For example, over the last ten years, the road fatality rate de-
creased by forty percent in France. However, the implied social cost of road
accidents is still very high (Doyle, 2005). By 2020, road-traﬃc accidents should
become the third cause of the disability-adjusted life years lost due to disease
or injury worldwide (Murray and Lopez, 1997). In 1990, this cause ranked only
ninth.
A major reason for the improvement of the situation in the OECD has
been the development of incentives for safe driving. Experience rating schemes
used by the insurance industry have incentive properties (see Boyer and Dionne,
1989; Abbring et al, 2003). They are supplemented by point-record driving
licenses based on traﬃc violations. In many countries, each convicted traﬃc
oﬀense is filed with a specific number of demerit points. When the accumulated
number of points exceeds a given threshold, the driving license is suspended.
Point removal clauses are added so that this penalty can be avoided in the
long run.1 A point-record driving license was implemented in Quebec in 1978,
together with a no-fault insurance regime for bodily injuries which replaced a
tort system.2 The road fatality rate decreased by fifty percent during the fifteen
years that followed.
In Quebec, the Société de l’Assurance Automobile du Quebec (referred to as
SAAQ in what follows) is a public monopoly which provides coverage for bodily
injury. The SAAQ is also in charge of accident prevention and control, including
the management of driving licenses. Before 1992, the rating structure for bodily
injury insurance was completely flat. The public authorities in Quebec decided
to implement an experience rating scheme based on accumulated demerit points,
a reform applied from December 1, 1992 onwards. This mechanism was added
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to other incentives, i.e., fines, the point-record driving license in force since 1978,
and the private sector insurance pricing scheme for property damage.
This paper analyses the incentive properties of both point-record driving
license and insurance pricing based on traﬃc violations. Studies on incentive
mechanisms for road safety have been discussed in the economic literature for
many years (Peltzman, 1975; Landes, 1982; Boyer and Dionne, 1987). In the
presence of asymmetric information, insurers use partial insurance or experience
rating to improve resource allocation. Both schemes have been proved to be eﬃ-
cient for handling moral hazard and adverse selection. Diﬀerent empirical tests
have been proposed to measure the eﬀectiveness of such mechanisms for road
safety (Sloan et al, 1995; Boyer and Dionne, 1989) or to measure the presence of
residual asymmetric information problems in insurers’ portfolios (Chiappori and
Salanié, 2000; Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse, 2001). More recently, Abbring,
Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) designed a new test based on the dynamics of in-
surance contracts to detect the presence of residual moral hazard. Their model
makes it possible to separate the moral hazard eﬀect on accidents from unob-
served heterogeneity. They found no evidence of moral hazard in the French car
insurance market. The convex structure of the French "bonus-malus" system
is used to show that the optimal eﬀort level exerted by a rational policyholder
increases after a claim at fault. In our study, insurance pricing is not the ma-
jor incentive scheme but rather a measure used to complement fines and the
point-record driving licence. Moreover, the pricing scheme of the Quebec public
automobile insurance is not strictly increasing and convex with respect to past
demerit points but is increasing by steps. Finally, time eﬀects are important
in Quebec’s point-record system, so we cannot apply directly the Abbring et al
(2003) econometric methodology.
Insurance pricing may not suﬃce as a tool for designing an optimal road
safety policy since it may not create the appropriate incentives for reckless drivers
(Sloan et al, 1995). Bourgeon and Picard (2007) show how point-record driving
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licence suspensions provide incentives for road safety among normal drivers
(those who respond to the usual incentive schemes) when the judicial system
or the insurance market fail to provide optimal incentives. Point-record driving
licences also allow the government to incapacitate reckless drivers. Fines for
traﬃc violations may be ineﬀective for reckless drivers when their amounts are
bounded above, either because some drivers would not be able to pay them or
for some equity reasons (see also Shavell, 1987). However, fines do reinforce
the eﬀectiveness of the point record mechanism by providing more incentives to
normal drivers. In the Bourgeon and Picard model which uses only two levels
of prevention, the optimal fine must be set at the maximal level and must be
neither progressive nor regressive. These authors also discuss the optimality of
point removal mechanisms as a screening device. Public intervention can also be
justified when there is a significant diﬀerence between the private and the social
cost of human lives (Viscusi, 1993). Finally, drivers may be unaware of their
own accident or infraction probabilities or may misunderstand some features
of the incentive environment. With respect to the theoretical contribution of
Bourgeon and Picard (2007), we shall test the prediction that the point-record
driving licence promotes road safety under moral hazard. We shall also analyse
the Quebec public insurance pricing scheme based on past convictions as a pro-
gressive fine. It can also be interpreted as a bonus malus scheme.
We present the data base in Section 2 as well as our first empirical re-
sults related to the introduction of the new pricing policy implemented in 1992.
The point-record mechanisms (driving license suspension and insurance pricing)
are described in Section 3 and their incentive properties are investigated in a
continuous-time model of optimal behavior that extends the previous literature
significantly. These results are then confronted with empirical findings. Iden-
tifiability issues created by unobserved heterogeneity are addressed in Section
4. Section 5 presents empirical evidence on the incentive properties of the two
point-record mechanisms as well as those of fines. In the spirit of Abbring et
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al (2003), we propose a means of disentangling unobserved heterogeneity from
incentive eﬀects in a duration model. It involves including an actuarial pre-
dictor as an oﬀset variable in the hazard function. The incentives created by
the threat of driving license suspension are found to increase with accumulated
demerit points. These findings confirm the theoretical analysis. We also find
that driving license suspension spells reduce the risks of accidents and traﬃc
violations.
The experience rating system implemented in 1992 has substantially re-
duced traﬃc violations among all drivers, whatever their incentive level. We
compare the overall eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent incentive schemes, and try to
link global results to theoretical properties of the relation between safe driving
eﬀort and traﬃc violation risk. Lastly, we derive monetary equivalents for traf-
fic violations and license suspensions. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6 and
technicalities are relegated to an appendix available at the URL
http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/publications/ (working paper 2008-05).
2 Presentation of the data base and prelimi-
nary empirical results
Our data base represents roughly one percent of the SAAQ portfolio. The panel
covers the period from January 1, 1983 to December 31, 1996. A first sample of
40,000 license holders was selected at random at the beginning of 1983. Then
about 300 young drivers were added each following year.3 Leaving the motor
insurance market is the only cause of attrition in the data base. The attrition
rate per year is close to 1.5%, which is very low as compared to the private
sector. This attrition result is obviously explained by the monopolistic status
of the SAAQ. The endogenous attrition is not very high. It was estimated from
a bivariate probit model on traﬃc oﬀenses and departures from the sample. A
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score test for the nullity of the correlation coeﬃcient between the two equations4
was performed with the regression components set used in Section 5. The null
hypothesis was not rejected at a five percent significance level. Hence the at-
trition risk adds no significant information to the assessment of traﬃc violation
risk.
The personal characteristics of each driver are available on the driving
license for the current period. These characteristics are used as regression com-
ponents in the empirical study. Several types of events are recorded in the data
base; they are listed below with related variables in addition to the date. 1)
Accidents which have led to a police report. Only those with bodily injury are
compensated by the SAAQ. 2) Convicted violations of the Road Safety Code,
together with the number of demerit points which are used in the point-record
mechanisms. The number of demerit points is based on the severity of the traﬃc
violation. Their distribution is given in Section 3.4. 3) Driving license suspen-
sions, which are spells rather than events, and 4) Premium payments which since
the 1992 reform are related to accumulated demerit points. These payments are
made every two years at the policyholder’s birthday.
Between 1985 and 1996, the average yearly frequencies of accidents with
bodily injuries, accidents of all types (not including jointly-agreed reports to
private insurers) and traﬃc violations are equal to, respectively, 1.4%, 6.7%
and 16.9%. Figure 1 represents the relative frequencies derived from a one
year centered moving average.5 There is an overall decline in the frequency of
accidents, whereas the frequency of traﬃc violations remains more stationary.
This may seem surprising, but it is explained by the evolution of the traﬃc
control environment. For instance, the number of traﬃc control devices such as
radars increased during the 1980s and 1990s. An increase in the rate of traﬃc
oﬀenses recorded by devices or police oﬃcers among those committed explains
this relationship. Figure 1 shows evidence of several periods where the frequency
of traﬃc violations increased along with opposite variations in the frequencies of
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accidents. A step-up in traﬃc control during these periods may well explain such
observations. A traﬃc violation committed by a driver must be selected twice
in order to be filed with demerit points. It must first be recorded by a control
device or a police oﬃcer. We already mentioned that the related selection rate
increased in the past. Second, the recorded traﬃc violation must be convicted.
The filing of a traﬃc violation is somewhat discretionary. After the 1992 reform
for instance, people are being forced to pay more in premiums given demerit
points, and we might expect policemen to be more hesitant to hand them out,
and to give warnings instead.6 The conviction rate is less likely to vary with
time than the recording rate.
Insert Figure 1 about here
In Figure 1, a downturn is also observed for the frequency of traﬃc vio-
lations just before the date (December 1, 1992) of the reform which introduced
the experience rating structure based on demerit points. Notice that the reform
was announced four months before its enforcement, which may explain this lag.7
On average, the annual frequency of traﬃc violations was equal to 17.6% before
the reform and 15.4% afterwards, which corresponds to a 12.5% decrease. The
1992 reform can be interpreted as a laboratory experiment to test whether an
exogenous change in the use of memory reduces traﬃc violations. But the lower
rate of traﬃc violations following the 1992 Quebec reform may be due to the
change of other factors that may influence the driver behavior. Identifying the
influence of these factors necessitates a control group that is not aﬀected by the
policy change. Unfortunately, we do not have access to such a control group
since the insurer is a monopoly and bodily insurance is compulsory.8 In Section
5.2, we shall link the average decrease of the frequency of traﬃc violations before
and after the 1992 reform to the overall eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent incentive
schemes.
Monetary and non monetary incentives for safe driving are based on traﬃc
violations as well as the optimal behavior models designed in Section 3. However
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the actual social cost of road traﬃc is caused by accidents. To reconcile these two
approaches, let us mention two results. First, demerit points are good predictors
of accidents. This is well documented in the literature and is confirmed on our
data in Section 5.1. Second, the global stationarity of convicted traﬃc violations
frequency observed in Figure 1 concurs with a probable decrease in the frequency
of committed traﬃc violations (see the aforementioned developments on selection
rates). Lowering traﬃc violation risk through point-record mechanisms should
also lower accident risk and the related social cost.
Finally, Figure 1 shows that accidents with bodily injuries evolve in much
the same way as all those recorded in the SAAQ file. We include accidents of
all types in the empirical analysis in order to obtain more stable results.9
3 Incentive eﬀects of point-record mechanisms
3.1 Point-record mechanisms in Quebec
In this section, we describe Quebec’s point-record mechanisms which are based
on traﬃc violations, both monetary (insurance premiums) and non-monetary
(point-record driving license). Comparisons are given with respect to the mech-
anisms used by other countries. We investigate the incentive properties of point-
record mechanisms in Sections 3.2 to 3.4.
In many countries nowadays, driving license suspensions are based on de-
merit points. In Quebec, demerit points are assigned to convictions for traﬃc
oﬀenses and their number depends on the traﬃc violation severity. When the
accumulated number of demerit points reaches or exceeds a given threshold,
the driving license is suspended. Before January 1990 this threshold was set at
twelve in Quebec and has been increased to fifteen since then.
In order to mitigate the social cost of driving license suspension, point
removal systems exist for most real-world point-record driving licenses. In Que-
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bec, the demerit points related to a given driving oﬀense are removed after two
years. Hence, driving license suspensions will depend on the demerit points
recorded during the last two years. The French system is similar, with a three
year seniority for the redemption of oﬀenses and a twelve point threshold. New
York State follows the same logic as Quebec and France (with an eighteen month
seniority and an eleven point threshold). The average number of demerit points
per convicted oﬀense is equal to 2.4 in Quebec. It takes about six traﬃc viola-
tions within two years to trigger a license suspension, an unlikely outcome when
the annual traﬃc violation frequency is equal to 16.9%. But heterogeneity of
risks is high and a point-record driving licence is also an incapacitating device
of risky and reckless drivers through the licence suspensions. Another point re-
moval system consists in cancelling all the demerit points after a given period
of violation-free driving. This mechanism was recently implemented in Spain,
with a two year period. Utah has a point-record driving license similar to the
Spanish one.
The experience rating structure introduced by the SAAQ in December 1,
1992 links each premium paid every two years to the demerit points accumulated
over the previous two years. The rating structure is given in Section 3.4. Once
the premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with a fresh zero point record.
Thus the length of the record relevant to the derivation of optimal behavior
never exceeds two years.
3.2 Basic model for a point-record driving license with-
out point removal
Bourgeon and Picard (2007) analyze the incentive eﬀects of point-record driving
licenses. Their model uses a binary eﬀort variable. We extend their approach
with a continuous eﬀort level. Hence the eﬀectiveness of eﬀort may also be a
continuous function of contract time, a desirable property for empirical valida-
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tion. We show that under fairly general conditions, a rational policyholder’s safe
driving eﬀort will increase with the number of accumulated demerit points.
We suppose that the driving license is revoked when the driver reaches
a total of N demerit points. For the sake of simplicity, each convicted traﬃc
violation is linked to one supplementary demerit point in this section.10 A driver
with a suspended driving license is reinstated after a period D with a fresh zero-
point record like that of a beginner.11 The duration D may be fixed or random
in the model. In Quebec, a licence suspension is of random length because
drivers must pass a new exam after a given period before recovering their driving
license. A rational driver maximizes his expected lifetime utility expressed in $
and derived from:
• An instantaneous driving utility, du.
• A time-dependent disutility of eﬀort, denoted as e(t).12 This eﬀort level
is linked with an instantaneous traﬃc violation frequency risk, denoted as
λ(e(t)).13 The hazard function λ is assumed to be a positive, decreasing
and strictly convex function of the eﬀort level.
In this section, we suppose that there is no point removal mechanism.
In that case, the lifetime expected utility (we assume an infinite horizon) will
depend only on the number n of accumulated demerit points. The Bellman




− λ∗(un − un+1)
r
, (0 ≤ n < N), (1)





e+ [λ(e)×∆u] . (2)
Technical details can be found in Appendix A.1. In equation (2), ∆u is the
lifetime utility loss between the current state and the one reached after an ad-
ditional traﬃc oﬀense. Once quantified, ∆u is the monetary equivalent of this
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traﬃc violation. Values of this type are derived in Section 5.2. The objective
function minimized in (2) is the disutility flow of both eﬀort (short term compo-
nent) and the expected lifetime utility loss (long term). The function λ∗ is the
convex dual of the hazard function λ. All the un are lower than umax = du/r, the
private lifetime driving utility without the point-record driving license. Equa-
tion (1) means that λ∗(un − un+1)/r is the minimal private utility cost of the
point-record mechanism for a driver with n demerit points. In our models, the
optimal eﬀort level and its related eﬀectiveness depend on the argument of λ∗.
The cycle of lifetime utilities is closed with a link between u0 and uN , the lifetime
expected utility just after the suspension of the driving license. For instance,
if the private disutility of driving license suspension is only the loss of driving
utility during a period D, we have that
uN = βu0, β = E[exp(−rD)]. (3)
The utilities are then derived from the recurrence equations (1) and (3). Optimal
eﬀort depends on the variation of lifetime utility as it minimizes the function
defined in equation (2). Hence, in this setting, optimal eﬀort will depend on the
number n of accumulated demerit points but not on time, and we denote it as
en. It is shown in Appendix A.1 that en increases with n for any given value of
N . Then the related frequency of violations λn = λ(en) decreases with n.
Fines represent another monetary incentive scheme applied in Quebec dur-
ing the whole period investigated in this study. Let us denote fa as the average
fine for a traﬃc violation conviction. Since fines and premiums are low in com-
parison to average wealth, we leave out risk aversion. With fines, incentives are
eﬀective if






This means that the average fine is added to the utility loss in the argument of
λ∗, which determines optimal eﬀort. If fines are combined with the preceding
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point-record driving license, the optimal eﬀort still increases with n for a given
value of the average fine.
3.3 Point-record driving licenses with point removal
In Quebec, each traﬃc violation is redeemed at the end of a two-year period.
Integrating this feature in the optimal behavior model is diﬃcult, as all the
seniorities of non-redeemed driving oﬀenses must be included as state variables
in the dynamic programming equations. Lifetime utility is expected to increase
with time for a given number of demerit points accumulated. Optimal eﬀort
depends on the diﬀerence between the present utility and a substitute utility
(i.e., that reached after an additional traﬃc violation). With the point removal
system in force in Quebec, the substitute utility increases with time as does the
present utility. Time should have more value for worse situations, hence the
substitute utility should increase faster than the present utility. Thus optimal
eﬀort should decrease with time. Besides, we prove in Appendix A.2 that optimal
eﬀort is continuous at the time of a point removal. This property will be tested
empirically in Section 5.1. Optimal eﬀort is then expected to increase with each
traﬃc violation in order to compensate for the decreasing link between time and
eﬀort. On the whole, the incentive properties of the point removal system in
force in Quebec are close to those of a mechanism without point removal when
it comes to the number of demerit points accumulated.
3.4 Incentive eﬀects of premiums indexed on demerit
points: The example of Quebec
Table 1 presents the rating structure enforced for each driving license on the
first contract birthday following December 1, 1992. The premium paid every
two years after this date depends on the number of demerit points accumulated
in the last two years. It does not represent the total premium for bodily injury
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insurance but the additional premium related to demerit points. This average
premium is equal to $54.60, and complements a yearly driving license fee for
insurance coverage equal to $107.
Insert Table 1 about here
In this section, the incentive properties of this rating structure are analysed
separately from the point-record driving license. An important input is the
distribution of demerit points for a given driving oﬀense, which we left out in
Section 3.2. Denoting fj as the proportion of traﬃc violations with j demerit
points, we have the following values
f1 = 4.71%; f2 = 52.32%; f3 = 38.34%; f4 = 2.83%; f5 = 1.80%. (5)
Note that f5 actually refers to oﬀenses with five points and more. From Table 1,
we see that the premium is a step function of the accumulated demerit points.
Because of the local non-convexity of the premium, the incentives may not always
increase with the number of demerit points accumulated. Let us consider for
instance a policyholder just before her contract birthday. The incentive level
will be stronger with two accumulated demerit points than with four. With four
points, it is indeed less than likely that the next traﬃc oﬀense will trigger an
increase in premium. The corresponding probability is 2.83 + 1.80 = 4.63%,
if we assume that the distribution of the fj is independent of the accumulated
demerit points. The incentives for safe driving are stronger at a two-point level
because the probability of climbing a step in the rating structure after a traﬃc
oﬀense is close to one. The aforementioned result stands in contrast to the one
obtained by Abbring et al (2003) for the French "bonus-malus" scheme and its
exponential structure.
Let us design an optimal behavior model based on this rating structure.
Once the premium is paid, the driver is reinstated with a fresh zero point record.
Hence the optimal control model can be designed with the next contract birthday
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as the horizon. Let πn be the premium paid for a n point record. As we here
discard the point-record driving license and its possible deprivation, the driving
utility is no longer a parameter. On the other hand, we retain fines in the
incentives for safe driving. We denote vn(t) as the optimal expected disutility of
premiums and fines until the next contract birthday, where t is the seniority of
the last birthday and n is the number of demerit points accumulated since that
date. We have the terminal conditions
vn(T ) = πn, ∀n = 0, . . . , N. (6)
With the notations of Section 3.2, the optimal eﬀort level depends on the ar-
gument of λ∗. If incentives are related to fines and insurance premiums, this
argument is the sum of the average fine fa and of the expected variation of
vn(t) after a traﬃc oﬀense (see Appendix A.3). Hence optimal eﬀort is de-
termined by fa + ∆vn(t), with ∆vn(t) =
³P
j / fj>0 fj vmin(n+j,N)(t)
´
− vn(t).
Derivations show that the average of ∆vn(t) with respect to n does not vary
much with time. The terminal values of ∆vn are derived from equations (5), (6)
and Table 1. For n = 0, 2, 4, we obtain
∆v0(T ) = $2.32; ∆v2(T ) = $47.65; ∆v4(T ) = $3.43. (7)
The incentives with two points accumulated are much stronger than with four
points, which confirms the analysis following equation (5). The overall average
of ∆vn(t) with respect to t and n is close to $12, a nine percent increase with
respect to an $130 average fine. In Section 5.2, this increase will be compared
with the variation in traﬃc violation frequency before and after the reform.
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4 Description and indentification issues on count
data in insurance
Frequency risk models in insurance are addressed at length by the actuarial
literature. Actuarial models use mixtures of Poisson models to describe the
dynamics of the data. Their main limitation is that identification issues are
not taken into account, since the observed dynamics are supposed to be cre-
ated only by the revelation of unobserved heterogeneity. If random eﬀects are
time-independent, the predictor summarizing the individual history (the "bonus-
malus" coeﬃcient) decreases with risk exposure (bonus) and increases with the
number of events (malus). Consider for instance a mixture of Poisson processes
with a hazard function λi(t)εi for policyholder i. The parameter λi(t) depends
on the observable individual information. The multiplicative random eﬀect εi
verifies E(εi) = 1; V (εi) = σ2. Actuarial predictors are based on expecta-
tions of the type E(εi |Ni,t), where Ni,t is the number of insurance claims made
by policyholder i between 0 and t. These conditional expectations can be de-
rived in a parametric setting, for instance if εi follows a Gamma distribution
(Dionne, Vanasse, 1989). Semiparametric derivations with a linearity constraint
on the shape of the predictor can also be retained. This is known as the "linear
credibility" approach (Bühlmann, 1967). The two approaches lead to the same
"bonus-malus" coeﬃcient
bE(εi |Ni,t) = 1 + ( bσ2 ×Ni,t)




This formula reflects the continuous time-eﬀect of the revelation of unobserved
heterogeneity on the one hand. On the other hand, there is a jump of the pre-
dictor at each event occurrence. The estimated hazard function which integrates
experience rating is then equal to bλi(t)× bE(εi |Ni,t).
Disentangling incentive eﬀects from unobserved heterogeneity is an identi-
fication issue. The basic strategy is to obtain statistics which are invariant with
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respect to the mixing distribution related to hidden features in the risk distri-
bution. Abbring et al (2003) provide an inference strategy when the hazard
function is multiplied by a constant β after each event (accident for instance)
and does not vary with time. Assessing the existence of moral hazard amounts
to estimating β and testing for β < 1 if the marginal benefit of eﬀort increases
with the number of claims. Time eﬀects do however exist in the point-record
mechanism in force in Quebec, so we cannot apply this approach here. In Sec-
tion 3.3, we showed that safe driving eﬀort induced by the point-record driving
license increases with the number of demerit points and decreases with time if
this number is greater than zero. The induced duration-event eﬀects on traf-
fic violation risk are opposed to those created by the revelation of unobserved
heterogeneity. In non-life insurance, empirical hazard functions related to fre-
quency risks usually increase with claims and decrease with time. This justifies
the "bonus-malus" systems and means that incentive eﬀects do not outweigh
the revelation eﬀect on this type of data.
5 Empirical results on the incentive eﬀects of
point-record mechanisms
5.1 Point-record driving license
In this section, we analyze the data before the 1992 reform which introduced
the experience rating scheme based on demerit points. Thus the point-record
driving license interacts only with fines. Regressions are performed from January
1985 (we need a two-year history to derive the accumulated demerit points) to
December 1992, date of the reform enforcement. We try to obtain a confirmation
of the theoretical findings of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 (i.e., the eﬀort level increases
globally with the number of demerit points accumulated and decreases with the
seniority of non redeemed traﬃc violations, if any), and to confirm the presence
15
of moral hazard in the data.
The whole history of traﬃc violations is useful in assessing the revelation
of unobserved heterogeneity, whereas the last two years are enough to determine
the incentive level. We use a two-step estimation strategy. First, we derive an
actuarial predictor which is updated every month, and include it as a constant
(an "oﬀset" variable) in the hazard functions of convicted traﬃc oﬀenses and
accidents. Second, a proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) is used to estimate
these hazard functions. We retained the following specification
λji (t) = exp(xi(t)βj)×gj(cdpi(t))×kj(nspsi(t))×BM ji (m(t))×hSi(t)j (ci(t)). (9)
In equation (9), λji (t) is the hazard function of type j (j = 1 : traﬃc violation
or j = 2 : accident) for driver i at calendar time t. Regression components
which do not refer to the individual driver record are denoted by the line-vector
xi(t). We retained the gender, driving license class, place of residence, age of
the driver and calendar eﬀects related to years and months.14 The number of
demerit points accumulated in the last two years is denoted as cdpi(t), and a
decreasing shape is expected for g1 from the theoretical model of Sections 3.2
and 3.3. The variable nspsi(t) is the number of past driving license suspension
spells. The link with traﬃc violation risk should be decreasing if such a spell
increases the perceived driving utility or the perceived risk level. The actuarial
predictor is denoted as BM ji (m(t)) and is updated each month, with m(t) the
month related to t. Its estimation is discussed later on.
Eﬀort is expected to decrease with time only if the number of demerit
points accumulated is greater than zero. Hence we specified a stratified propor-
tional hazards model.15 The baseline hazard functions hSi(t)j depend on the risk
type j and on the stratum Si(t). There are two strata, depending on whether the
variable cdpi(t) is equal to zero or not. Lastly, contract time ci(t) is integrated
into the baseline hazard function hj. The function ci is set equal to zero at the
beginning of the whole period. Then it is reset to zero at each event which trig-
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gers a variation of the accumulated demerit points (i.e., traﬃc violation or point
removal). This event-driven operation should eliminate interactions between
calendar and contract-time eﬀects for the stratum associated to cdp > 0.
In equation (9), the actuarial predictor BM ji is assumed to reflect the reve-
lation of unobserved heterogeneity rather than incentives, whereas the functions
gj(cdp) and hSj are first related to the event and time eﬀects of incentives. We
do not, however, pretend to disentangle exactly the revelation of unobserved
heterogeneity from the incentive eﬀects with this specification because the actu-
arial predictor is calibrated on the observed dynamics, which result from both
eﬀects. From the theoretical model in Section 3.3, we expect eﬀort to increase
with the number of demerit points accumulated, under moral hazard. This is
globally true in Table 2, where the function g1 decreases beyond seven points. It
is worth mentioning that the SAAQ warns the policyholders when their accumu-
lated demerit points reach a seven point threshold.16 For robustness, another
empirical result (available upon request) is consistent with an eﬀective eﬀort
beyond seven demerit points. Indeed, when equation (9) is estimated on traﬃc
violations without the actuarial predictor included as an oﬀset variable, the es-
timated function g1 increases from one to seven points and then decreases. As
the revelation eﬀect of a traﬃc violation is always positive, this result can be
explained only by an opposite incentive eﬀect of the point-record driving license
beyond seven points.17 As a consequence, the actual revelation eﬀect of the
traﬃc violation record should be stronger than that given by the actuarial pre-
dictor, calibrated on the observed dynamics. To compensate for this bias, the
actual incentive eﬀect of accumulated demerit points should be stronger than
its estimation in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
The number of past driving license suspensions generates interesting results
in the traﬃc violation equation. One suspension spell entails a 5.6% reduction
in traﬃc violation frequency, and two bring about a 13.1% reduction. One
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possible explanation is that the perceived driving utility of drivers increases
after a driving licence suspension spell. Another interpretation points to an
availability eﬀect (Tversky, Kahneman, 1973), where the subjective estimation of
the frequency of an event is based on how easily a related outcome can be brought
to mind.18 Table 2 indicates that the number of demerit points accumulated
has less influence on accident risk than on traﬃc violation risk. A possible
interpretation is that we cannot separate at fault from no-fault accidents. In the
literature, the incentive eﬀect is usually higher with at fault accidents. Besides,
drivers nearing the license suspension threshold might also apply opportunistic
strategies regarding traﬃc violations (e.g. paying more attention to radars)
without otherwise modifying their attitude towards road traﬃc risk. As with
traﬃc violations, past driving license suspension spells reduce accident risk.
Traﬃc violations with a seniority greater than two years are redeemed
and do not have an incentive eﬀect on the drivers. In order to use this result
when disentangling unobserved heterogeneity from moral hazard in the duration
dimension, we estimated a dynamic random eﬀects specification. Hence the
seniority of past traﬃc violations will be taken into account by the actuarial
predictor. Let us denote N ji,y the number of type j events observed for driver i
and year y. The parameter of the related Poisson distribution is λji,y ε
j
i,y, where
the first component depends on the observable information and the second one
is the dynamic random eﬀect reflecting the residual eﬀect of hidden information.
Random eﬀects are supposed stationary, with an expectation equal to one and
i.i.d. between the individuals. If bλji,y is the estimation in the Poisson model
without random eﬀects19, a consistent estimation of the covariances between
the random eﬀects is the following




i,y − bλji,y)(N1i,y−h − bλ1i,y−h)P
i,y
bλji,y bλ1i,y−h ( for h > 0 or j 6= 1).
(10)
The sums are derived on all the possible couples i, y from the sample and the
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integer lag h is assumed to be lower than the maximum length of individual
histories. The variance (case h = 0, j = 1) is estimated from an overdispersion
of residuals (see Appendix A.4). The covariance estimated in (10) clearly reflects
the predictive ability of a traﬃc violation on the frequency risk of type j assessed
h years after.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 exhibits a decreasing shape for both covariances series. This means
that the predictive ability of past traﬃc violations on both risk types decreases
with the seniority. If the seniority is larger than two years, this result stems
only from a revelation eﬀect since the traﬃc violation has been redeemed. The
bonus-malus coeﬃcient BM ji (m) given in equation (9) is obtained from an aﬃne
probabilistic regression of a multiplicative random eﬀect εji,y(m) (related to driver
i, monthm (related to the year y(m)) and type j event) on the number of traﬃc
violations recorded for the driver for each past month. More details are given in
Appendix A.4. As the second goal of this section is to estimate the time eﬀects
of incentives from the observed dynamics, we need results on the behavior of
actuarial coeﬃcients. Their time decay is usually lower for a claimless history
than with the basic actuarial approach of (8), but stronger since the last claim,
if any. In this case indeed, the continuous aging of past events supplements the
increase in risk exposure (see Pinquet, Guillén, Bolancé (2001)).
Insert Figure 2 about here
Two baseline hazard functions on traﬃc violation risk are presented in
Figure 2. They are estimated on the stratum with cdp > 0 (resp. with cdp =
0), from the ratio between the number of traﬃc violations and risk exposure,
expressed in equation (9). Contract-time is less than two years as it represents
the time elapsed since the last variation in accumulated demerit points. The
frequency of traﬃc violations decreases by 57% (resp. 43%) during the two years
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on the stratum with cdp > 0 (resp. with cdp = 0). This decrease is explained
first by the actuarial coeﬃcient. For the stratum with cdp > 0, the average value
of the actuarial predictor decreases from 1.93 to 1.15, whereas the corresponding
average varies from 1.10 to 0.85 for the other stratum20. As explained earlier, the
sharper decrease of the predictor in the presence of recent past traﬃc violations
(cdp > 0) is due to their continuous aging, which supplements the increase in
risk exposure. The hazard functions are globally stationary. We do not obtain
the increasing property expected from the theory for the stratum cdp > 0.
A possible explanation is that the revelation eﬀect of past traﬃc violations
regarding frequency risk is underestimated in Table 3 when the lag is less than
two years, as this eﬀect is counteracted by the incentives. If the covariances
in Table 3 were derived solely from unobserved heterogeneity, they would be
greater for lags less than two years, and this would increase the ageing eﬀect of
past claims in the actuarial predictor. As a result, the decrease of the actuarial
predictor would be sharper on the stratum with cdp > 0, and the residual
baseline hazard would be globally increasing.
Let us test another prediction of the theoretical model, which is the con-
tinuity of eﬀort at the time of a point removal. If a traﬃc violation is followed
by a two year violation free record, the baseline hazard function increases from
0.967 (the terminal value of the baseline hazard function related to cdp > 0)
to 0.977, which corresponds to the initial value of the other hazard function.
On the other hand, the actuarial predictor is continuous at the time of a point
removal. Hence the continuity property of eﬀort is almost fulfilled.
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5.2 Incentive eﬀects of the 1992 reform and monetary
equivalents for traﬃc violations and license suspen-
sions
In Section 2, we mentioned a 12.5% decrease in the average frequency of traﬃc
violations before and after the reform which introduced the experience rating
structure based on demerit points. This result is slightly modified if we control
with the regression components used in Table 2. A regression estimated from
1985 to 1996 with the covariates of Section 5.1 and a dummy related to the
period following December 1, 1992 associates the reform with a 15% decrease.21
The results of Section 3.4 (for instance equation (7)) suggest that the
number of demerit points accumulated since the last birthday should influence
the eﬀectiveness of the reform. However, we did not obtain significant results in
this direction. The drivers’ limited knowledge of the environment could explain
this poor results, a point developed later.
Let us make an overall comparison of the three incentive schemes. We use
the model without point removal of Section 3.2 to analyze the incentives for
drivers in Quebec. Before the 1992 reform, fines were supplemented by a point-
record driving license. Optimal eﬀort after n non redeemed traﬃc violations
depends on the argument of λ∗, which is the dual of the hazard function λ (see
equation (2)). This argument is equal to fa+ un− un+1 from equation (4). We
recall that the average fine fa is equal to $130. Besides, the 1992 reform entails
an average increase in the argument of λ∗ equal to $12 from Section 3.4.22 At
this point, it seems interesting to relate the optimal risk level and the argument
of λ∗, which determines the incentive level. This relation can be assessed from
the elasticity between optimal frequency risk and the argument of λ∗. When
the incentives are eﬀective, it can be shown that this elasticity is less than −1
if and only if log(λ) is a concave function of eﬀort (elasticity and concavity are
considered locally: see Appendix A.5 for a proof). A global elasticity equal to
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−1 is linked to an exponential decay of λ. With λ(e) = λ(0) × exp(−αe), the
optimal risk level as a function of ∆u (the argument of λ∗) is equal to 1/(α∆u)
if the incentives are eﬀective.
Let us assess the global eﬀectiveness of the 1992 reform. As the reform
entailed a significant reduction in traﬃc violation risk no matter the number
of demerit points accumulated, we can assume that incentives are eﬀective for
a representative driver.23 Eﬀective incentives lead us to analyse the elasticity
between traﬃc violation risk and the argument of λ∗. Suppose that we leave out
the modifications of lifetime utility variations due to the aggregation of incentive
schemes. Then we can relate:
• On the one hand, a 15% reduction in the frequency of traﬃc violations
after the 1992 reform.
• On the other hand, a relative increase in the argument of λ∗ lying between
9% and 10%. Indeed, the 1992 reform entails a $12 average increase in
the argument of λ∗. This increase supplements the other arguments of λ∗,
i.e., the $130 average fine and the utility variation for the point-record
driving license. In Table 2, the point-record driving license oﬀers signifi-
cant incentives to careful driving beyond a seven point threshold, a result
corresponding to only a minority of drivers (1.4%). The contribution of
the point-record driving license to the argument of λ∗ is low as compared
with fines.
This suggests that the elasticity between the optimal frequency risk and the
argument of λ∗ is less than -1 in this case. This result is linked to a locally concave
shape of log(λ) for the representative driver. However external eﬀects could also
explain the reduction in the frequency of traﬃc violations. We cannot eliminate
these eﬀects because there is no control group that is not aﬀected by the reform.
Besides, the elasticity would be modified if the distribution of demerit points for
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a given driving oﬀense (see equation (5)) was wrongly perceived by the drivers.
The $12 average of the increase in the argument of λ∗ is low, due to the high
frequency of drivers without demerit points since the last birthday (87%), and
to the low incentive level of the reform for these drivers (see equation (7)). This
incentive level mostly depends on the probability of moving up a step in the
premium schedule after an additional traﬃc violation, which must be associated
to four demerit points or more. If the perceived frequency of corresponding traﬃc
violations was greater than the actual one (i.e., f4 + f5 = 2.83 + 1.80 = 4.63%),
the incentive level would increase as well as the variation of the argument of λ∗
induced by the reform. In that case the elasticity would be closer to zero.
Lastly, let us assess monetary equivalents for a traﬃc violation and a li-
cense suspension. The monetary equivalent of a traﬃc violation for a driver is
the loss of lifetime utility, which depends on the number of traﬃc violations ac-
cumulated. A value can be derived from the eﬀectiveness of eﬀort estimated in
Table 2 and from the aforementioned link between eﬃciency of eﬀort and the in-
centive level. An additional traﬃc violation beyond seven accumulated demerit
points entails a reduction of traﬃc violation frequency close to twenty percent.
Although these drivers cannot be seen as representative, we will apply the elas-
ticity derived from the preceding developments. If a 9% increase in the argument
of λ∗ entails a 15% reduction in the frequency of traﬃc violations, a 20% decrease
of traﬃc violation frequency is associated with a 12% increase in the argument of
λ∗. The implied loss of lifetime utility depends on the traﬃc violation frequency
risk λ but mostly on the discount rate r (see Appendix A.6). With λ = 0.15, the
monetary equivalent of an additional traﬃc violation for these drivers belongs to
the interval [$120, $195] if r = 3%, and to [$41.1, $55.7] if r = 6%. Besides, the
growth rate of this monetary equivalent with respect to the number n of non re-
deemed traﬃc violations falls between r/λn and r/λn+1, where λn is the optimal
traﬃc violation frequency related to n. Monetary costs for license suspensions
are then obtained by adding the costs of traﬃc violations until the crossing of
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the demerit point threshold. Starting from a zero-point record and assuming
that six traﬃc violations are needed to entail a license suspension, the monetary
cost of a license suspension is bounded by $700 and $1178 if r = 3%, and if
λ0 = 0.17; λ1 = 0.17; λ2 = 0.16; λ3 = 0.15; λ4 = 0.12; λ5 = 0.09.24 Besides,
a misperception of the environment could modify the monetary equivalents of
traﬃc violations and license suspensions. We argued that an overestimation
of the frequency of severe traﬃc violations would increase the perceived incen-
tive eﬀect of the 1992 reform. In that case, the results obtained for monetary
equivalents should be upgraded.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we analyse the properties of policies designed to promote safe
driving. Three important incentive mechanisms for road safety are used in Que-
bec. The incentive eﬀects of the point-record driving license increase with the
number of demerit points accumulated. This confirms the presence of moral haz-
ard in the data. The point-record driving license acts as an incapacitating device
for reckless drivers. Also, past suspension spells entail a significant reduction in
the frequency of traﬃc violations and accidents.
Fines are on average the most eﬃcient device, but the absence of memory
entails a uniform incentive eﬀect for given characteristics of the policyholder.
We designed our incentive models with a representative driver, but there is of
course heterogeneity in the individual parameters, such as the threshold beyond
which the incentives are eﬀective. We did not have wealth variables at hand,
and an interesting empirical issue would have been to cross such variables with
a reform dummy in risk assessment.
The experience rated premium based on accumulated demerit points is
a monetary point-record mechanism. The empirical results exhibit a rather
uniform eﬀectiveness after its enforcement in 1992, i.e., a 15% decrease in the
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frequency of traﬃc violations. Its incentive eﬀects do not strictly increase with
the accumulated demerit points, however, because of the steps in the rating
structure. The actual incentive eﬀect of the reform looks more like that induced
by an increase in the average fine. The SAAQ modified its rating policy in 2008,
with a premium increase from the first demerit point. This should enhance
the eﬀectiveness of the premium schedule for the majority of drivers with a
violation-free record.
In this study we have not examined in detail the long-term evolution of
accidents, for we did not have access to the control variables of interest. Over
recent years, many road safety initiatives had an impact on accidents but did
not necessarily have any eﬀect on violations. These initiatives include such
measures as: occasional campaigns on fatal accidents; increased police patrols
to reduce speeding; and designated driver campaigns to prevent drinkers from
driving. It is also worth noting that the decline in deaths and serious injuries
can be explained by vehicular improvements and the wearing of seat belts. Such
measures are complementary to those studied in this article.
Notes
1These clauses and their incentive properties are detailed in Section 3.
2The North American continent preceded Europe in the design of such systems. Point-
record driving licenses were introduced in 1947 in the USA. Germany, France, and Spain
implemented these mechanisms in 1974, 1992 and 2005, respectively.
3Selecting at random one percent of the new licence holders every year would of course
have been a preferable sampling procedure. One thousand new licence holders would then
have been selected every year, as the entry rate in the SAAQ portfolio is close to 2.5%.
4Binary variables related to traﬃc oﬀenses and attrition were created on a monthly basis,
and explained with the covariates used in Section 5.1. The score test statistic is equal to 0.34.
Hence we do not reject the nullity of the correlation coeﬃcient at the usual significance levels.
5We begin in 1985 in order to match the regressions which follow, as a two-year history is
needed to derive the accumulated demerit points. Data are first averaged over one year, to
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account for strong seasonal eﬀects. A centered moving average derived on five fortnights is
then performed twice in order to reduce the volatility of the series.
6We thank a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
7Drivers with a contract birthday falling between the announcement of the reform and its
enforcement are not incited by the experience rated premium before this birthday. Incentives
exist otherwise (for these drivers after the birthday, and for all the other drivers). A referee
suggested using this natural experiment in order to disentangle the incentive eﬀects of the
reform from calendar eﬀects. We did not obtain significant results. Four months is however
a short period, and on average only one driver out of twelve was not incited by the rating
scheme during the period.
8See Manning et al (1987) for the use of a control group in the assessment of a cost sharing
modification in the health insurance market.
9Important variables in the regressions such as the number of accumulated demerit points
have low frequencies for the highest values. It is hard to make an accurate estimation if the
frequency of events is low, as it is the case for accidents with bodily injury.
10All the traﬃc oﬀenses recorded in the data base are linked to convictions, which is the
condition for the addition of demerit points.
11This reinstatement can be seen as a removal of demerit points. In the paper, we consider a
point removal mechanism to be a cancellation of demerit points applied before the suspension
of the driving license.
12Safe driving eﬀort can also reduce the expected disutility of accidents. If e → δ(e) is
the implied decrease in the disutility flow, replacing e by e − δ(e) in the model includes the
influence of safe driving eﬀort on accident disutility.
13The hazard function λ(e) corresponds to a probability p(e) in discrete time incentive
models.
14Comprehensive regressions based on two-year periods can be found in Dionne, Maurice,
Pinquet, and Vanasse (2001).
15Stratification in a proportional hazards model means that Cox likelihoods (of a multino-
mial logit type) are derived for each stratum and then multiplied together. In other words, an
individual with an observed event is assumed to have competed only with other individuals
in the same stratum and at risk at the same date. However, the same coeﬃcients for the
covariates are used across all strata.
16On the other hand, the drivers are not informed when oﬀenses are redeemed.
17The license suspension threshold increased in January 1990 from twelve to fifteen points.
We tested the eﬀect of this adjustment and did not obtain significant diﬀerences in the results.
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18We thank a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
19Data were observed from 1983 to 1992, and we retained the covariates denoted as x in
equation (9). The regression is performed on a monthly basis because risk exposure is updated
monthly in the derivation of actuarial coeﬃcients.
20The two regression components which determine the greatest variations in the additive
score (xβ in equation (9)) during the two years are age (-16% and -8% on the two strata) and
gender (-12% and -7%).
21We retained the covariates used in Table 3, except for dummies related to years and the
number of past license suspension spells. The estimated additive parameter for the reform
dummy is equal to -0.163, and the related standard deviation is equal to 0.008. Hence the
reform eﬀect is conclusive at the usual tests significance levels.
22In Section 3.4, we derived expected disutilities vn(t) until the next contract birthday.
They can be associated with a negative lifetime utility un(t). We have
un(t) = −vn(t) + exp(−r(T − t))u0(0); u0(0) =
−v0(0)
1− exp(−rT ) .
From the preceding equation, we have un(t)−un+1(t) = vn+1(t)−vn(t). The average increase
in disutility after a traﬃc oﬀense is equal to the corresponding decrease in lifetime utility.
23From equation (4), a suﬃcient condition to have this result is that the average fine is
higher than the threshold −1/λ
0
(0) beyond which the incentives are eﬀective.
24These values comply with the relative risks estimated in Table 2.
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TABLE 1:—SAAQ INSURANCE PREMIUMS FOR BODILY INJURY AS A FUNCTION 
OF ACCUMULATED DEMERIT POINTS SINCE THE LAST CONTRACT BIRTHDAY 
Accumulated demerit points 
(last two years) 
Premium for the next 
two years (Canadian $) 
Frequency 
(%) 
0,1,2,3 50 93.7 
4,5,6,7 100 4.9 
8,9,10,11 174 1.1 
12,13,14 286 0.2 
15 and more 398 0.1 
 
TABLE 2.—ESTIMATION OF THE HAZARD FUNCTION FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION 
AND ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RISKS 
Variable Level Frequency (%) Traffic violation risk Accident risk 
nsps: 
Number of past 
driving license 
suspension spells 
0 (*) 98.96 0 0 
1 0.94 -0.058 -0.064 
  (0.022) (0.046) 
2 0.09 -0.140 -0.519 
  (0.062) (0.168) 
3 and more 0.01 -0.091 -0.147 
   (0.156) (0.410) 
cdp: 
Number of demerit 
points 
accumulated 
(last two years) 
0 point 76.60 stratum stratum 
1 point (*) 0.39 0 0 
2 points 9.36 0.100 0.073 
  (0.060) (0.107) 
3 points 6.23 0.119 0.192 
  (0.061) (0.107) 
4 points 1.92 0.124 0.065 
   (0.062) (0.111) 
 5 points 2.09 0.155 0.121 
   (0.062) (0.110) 
 6 points 1.25 0.104 0.120 
   (0.063) (0.113) 
 7 points 0.72 0.102 0.005 
   (0.065) (0.118) 
 8 points 0.55 -0.032 0.101 
   (0.067) (0.120) 
 9 points 0.43 -0.133 0.152 
   (0.071) (0.125) 
 10 points 0.32 -0.184 0.084 
   (0.072) (0.127) 
 11 points 0.06 -0.051 -0.192 
   (0.104) (0.223) 
 12 points 0.04 -0.625 0.087 
   (0.147) (0.230) 
 13-14 points 0.04 -0.283 -0.347 
   (0.120) (0.265) 
(*): Reference level. Additive coefficients and level frequencies are weighted by duration. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. Additional regression variables are: gender, driving license class (9 levels), place of residence (16 
levels), age of the driver (5 slopes) as well as calendar effects related to years (8 levels) and months (12 levels). 
 
Number of observations: 3,587,654 duration-events of at most one month, derived from 41,290 driving licenses. 
Global test for the nullity of coefficients (traffic violations): likelihood ratio statistic = 19416.71.; degrees of freedom 
= 62; limit significance level < 0.0001. 
Global test for the nullity of coefficients (accidents): likelihood ratio statistic = 4464.91; degrees of freedom = 62; 
limit significance level < 0.0001. 
TABLE 3.—ESTIMATED MOMENTS OF RANDOM EFFECTS USED IN THE PREDICTION 
 ? ( )1 1, ,,i y i y hCov ε ε −  ? ( )2 1, ,,i y i y hCov ε ε −  
h = 0 0.981 0.636 
h = 1 0.800 0.482 
h = 2 0.745 0.368 
h = 3 0.731 0.336 
h = 4 0.704 0.344 
h = 5 0.705 0.293 
h = 6 0.648 0.289 
h = 7 0.673 0.288 
h = 8 0.636 0.342 
h = 9 0.608 0.296 
,
j
i yε : Multiplicative random effect for driver i, in period y, and risk of type j. 


































Figure 2: Baseline hazard functions for traffic violation risk, population stratified by accumulated 
demerit points (cdp) in the last two years (strata cdp=0 and cdp>0)
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A.1 Incentive eﬀects of point-record driving licenses: Model
without point removal
The Bellman equation on the expected utility is
un = max
e≥0




(du − e)− (r + λ(e))un − r un+1,
and equation (1).
Let us give the main properties of the function
λ∗ : ∆u→ min
e≥0
e+ [λ(e)×∆u] = min
e≥0
h(∆u, e) ,
with λ a positive, decreasing and strictly convex hazard function. The related





















Hence the dual function λ∗ is defined on the real line as the optimal eﬀort. From





⇒ λ∗(∆u) = λ(0)×∆u, (12)
and the dual function is linear in the neighborhood of 0, which corresponds to
no eﬀort. The dual function λ∗ is strictly increasing since λ is strictly positive.
If ∆u ≥ 0, we have that:






Hence λ∗ is an increasing homeomorphism on the real line.
The dual of a convex function is concave. This can be proved with geo-








∆u(∆u, eopt(∆u)) = λ(eopt(∆u)). (13)
Hence λ∗ is concave from the assumptions on λ and from the properties of eopt.
We give a proof of the increasing property of the optimal eﬀort level as a
function of accumulated demerit points. From equation (1), we obtain
un − un+1 = λ−1∗ (r(umax − un)), umax =
du
r
(0 ≤ n < N). (14)
The sequence (un)0≤n≤N is decreasing since we have umax ≥ un. Plugging
this result into equation (14) implies that the sequence (un − un+1)0≤n<N is
increasing. The optimal eﬀort level is denoted as en, and expressed as
en = arg min
e≥0
e+ [λ(e)× (un − un+1)] = eopt(un − un+1),
for 0 ≤ n < N , where eopt is defined from (11). As eopt is an increasing function,
the optimal eﬀort is an increasing function of the number of demerit points for
any given value of the license suspension threshold.
Let us specify the condition under which incentives are eﬀective. From
(14) and (12), we obtain









If fines are included in the incentives, un+1 is replaced by un+1− fa in equation
(1), which leads to the recurrence equation (see Figure 3)
du − run = λ∗(un − un+1 + fa)
⇔ un+1 = un + fa− λ−1∗ (du − run) = g(un). (16)
2
The fixed point of g is the lifetime driving utility if fines were the only incentive
scheme, i.e. eumax = du − λ∗(fa)r .
We of course assume that du > λ∗(fa), i.e. eumax > 0. If the two incentives are
mixed, we have un ≤ eumax and we deduce from (16) the properties of utilities
and of optimal eﬀort levels as functions of n that we obtained in the first place.
Besides, we have
en > 0 ,∀n, ⇔ fa+ un − un+1 > ∆u ,∀n.
This condition is fulfilled if
fa > ∆u = −1/λ0(0),
in which case the incentives are eﬀective at every level.
Notice that in this setting the optimal eﬀort depends on the lifetime utility
but not on the fines. Indeed, optimal eﬀort depends on the argument of λ∗. From
equation (16), this argument is equal to:
un − un+1 + fa = λ−1∗ (du − run).
A.2 Incentive eﬀects of point-record driving licenses: Model
with point removal
The Bellman equation on a holistic incentive model can be written as follows







= λ∗(fa+ u(S)−E [u(TR(S))]). (17)
The state variables S are the seniorities of each non redeemed traﬃc oﬀense (if
any), the related demerit points and the seniority of the last contract birthday
if the premium is included in the incentives. The related lifetime utility is u(S).
The state St is reached from S with an eventless history (no traﬃc oﬀense, point
3
removal or contract birthday) of duration t. The parameters du and fa are the
driving utility flow and the average fine, and E [u(TR(S))] is the lifetime utility
averaged with transition probabilities on the state(s) reached from S after a
traﬃc oﬀense. Continuity equations on utility at the time of a point removal
or of a contract birthday (in the latter case, the increase in lifetime utility is
equal to the disutility of the premium) and the equation linking the utility of
a beginner and the utility just after a license suspension define the solution
together with equation (17).
Let us prove the continuity of optimal eﬀort after a point removal in a sys-
tem where each traﬃc violation is redeemed beyond a given seniority threshold,
equal to T . We suppose that each traﬃc violation is associated to one demerit
point, and that incentives are related to fines and to the point-record driving
license. The state variables are then the seniorities of each non redeemed traﬃc
oﬀense, if any. Let us denote these variables as
S = (t1, . . . , tn), 0 ≤ t1 < . . . < tn < T.
The corresponding optimal eﬀort is denoted as e(S). Then the states reached
without traﬃc oﬀense before the next point removal are
St = (t1 + t, . . . , tn + t), 0 ≤ t < T − tn.
We denote the state reached from S after an additional traﬃc oﬀense (if n < N)
as
(0, t1, . . . , tn) = TR(S).
Since the lifetime utility is continuous after a point removal, we have the follow-
ing result:
n ≥ 1 : lim
t→(T−tn)−
u(St) = u(SR), SR = (t1 + T − tn, . . . , tn−1 + T − tn).
The state SR is reached from S if there is no traﬃc oﬀense before the first point
4
removal. Then it is easily seen that
lim
t→(T−tn)−




= u(0, t1 + T − tn, . . . , tn−1 + T − tn).
This means that the left continuity at T − tn of the map t → u(St) also holds
for the map t→ u [TR(St)] , which is associated with the states reached after an
additional traﬃc oﬀense. The reason is that redemption of past oﬀenses occurs
regardless of the future individual history.




and the continuity property of the optimal eﬀort level. Since we expect a global
increasing link between optimal eﬀort and the accumulated demerit points, the
time-eﬀect should globally be decreasing in order to fulfill this continuity prop-
erty.
A.3 Incentive eﬀects of the experience rating system
Let us derive the Bellman equation on the expected disutility function given in
(18), including an average fine of faj for a j demerit point traﬃc violation. The
optimal disutility function is obtained from the program
vn(t) = min
e≥0



































, (0 ≤ n ≤ N). (18)
5
A.4 Actuarial predictors with dynamic random eﬀects
A consistent estimation of the variance of the random eﬀect related to traﬃc




i,y − bλ1i,y)2 −N1i,yP
i,y
³bλ1i,y´2 . (19)
The moment-based estimators given in equations (10) and (19) can be improved
by a link between the expectation and the variance of dependent variables
(Liang, Zeger (1986)).
The bonus-malus coeﬃcient BM ji (m) given in equation (9) is obtained
from an aﬃne probabilistic regression of a multiplicative random eﬀect εji,y(m)
related to driver i, month m and type j event with respect to the number of
traﬃc violations recorded for the driver for each past month, and denoted as
N1i,m1 (m1 < m). With the assumption E(ε
j
i,y) = 1 ∀i, j, y, the predictor is given
by
BM ji (m) = bE(εji,y(m) |N1i,m1 (m1<m))
= 1 + tdCov(SN1i,m, εji,y(m)) hbV (SN1i,m)i−1 (SN1i,m − bE ¡SN1i,m¢), (20)
where SN1i,m = vecm1<m
(N1i,m1) is the stacked vector of numbers of past traﬃc
violations and where conditional expectation is restricted to aﬃne regression.
All the moments in equation (20) are estimated from the bλ1i,m = bE(N1i,m) and
from the estimated moments of random eﬀects.
A.5 Overall comparisons of incentive schemes
As a conclusion, let us derive the link given in Section 5.2 between the elasticity
of the optimal frequency of traﬃc violations and the argument of λ∗, which
determines the optimal eﬀort level. We perform a local expansion around a
value ∆u0 of the argument of λ∗, in a situation where the incentives are eﬀective
6
(i.e. ∆u0 > ∆u = −1/λ0(0)). If we write






































































Then the conclusions given in Section 3.2 are easily obtained.
A.6 Monetary equivalents of traﬃc violations
Let us suppose that the increase in the argument of λ∗ is close to 12% after a
traﬃc violation. This is the value retained in Section 5.2 for a driver with seven
demerit points accumulated, which corresponds to n = 3 traﬃc violations on
average. As the argument of λ∗ in the model without point removal and with
fines is equal to fa+ un − un+1 (see equation 16) we have that
fa+ un+1 − un+2 = 1.12×
¡
fa+ un − un+1
¢
. (21)
We shall compare the utility losses un+1−un+2 and un−un+1 from the recurrence
equation on lifetime utility, and obtain a monetary equivalent of an additional
traﬃc violation from a derivation of the utility loss un − un+1. We have
un+1 = g(un), g(u) = fa+ u− λ−1∗ (du − ru)
7
(see Figure 3). From the equality λ
0




(un) = 1 +
r
λn
, λn = λ(eopt(fa+ un − un+1)).
The parameter λn is the frequency risk corresponding to the optimal eﬀort ex-










≤ 1 + r
λn+1
. (22)







× (un − un+1) = 0.12× fa = 15.6 $, λn+1 ≤ λ0n ≤ λn.









Section 5.2 provides numerical examples with λn = 0.15, λn+1 = 0.12. The
monetary cost of a license suspension follows from a sum of the items related to
traﬃc violations and from the inequalities given in (22).
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Figure 3
Recurrence equation on the lifetime utility function
Point-record driving license without fines: u0n+1 = f(u
0
n)
































f(u) = u− λ−1∗ (r(umax − u)), g(u) = f(u) + fa.
Eﬀective incentives condition with and without fines
en > 0⇔ un < u = umax
µ
1 +
λ(0)
λ
0
(0)× du
¶
.
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